Kenya employs a standardized refugee management framework for Burundians, Somalis, and South Sudanese, anchored in its encampment policy, but applies varying degrees of scrutiny, security measures, and repatriation pressure based on group size, perceived security risks, and geopolitical factors. While all face camp confinement under the Refugees Act, Somalis endure the strictest controls due to terrorism links, South Sudanese receive integrated settlements, and smaller Burundian inflows allow lighter oversight.
Common Framework: Encampment Policy
Kenya's core approach—adopted in the 1990s amid massive inflows—requires refugees to reside in remote camps like Dadaab (northeast) or Kakuma/Kalobeyei (northwest), barring urban movement without permits. This stems from 1991-92 surges: Somalis fleeing civil war (300,000+ arrivals) and others from Ethiopia/Sudan, overwhelming resources and prompting security-focused isolation. Registration via UNHCR's PRIMES/BIMS, aid distribution, and basic services apply uniformly, with Kenya hosting ~860,000 total refugees as of late 2025.
Management of Somalis: High-Security Encampment
Somalis, numbering ~432,000 in Dadaab (50%+ of Kenya's refugees), face the harshest regime due to Al-Shabaab infiltration fears. Dadaab remains heavily policed with checkpoints, night curfews, and restricted exits; 2013-2022 repatriation drives (tripartite UNHCR-Kenya-Somalia agreement) sent back 100,000+, though inflows persist. Government rhetoric labels camps as terror hubs, leading to closures threats (e.g., 2016 shutdown order) and Kenyan Somali discrimination via passes historically. Urban Eastleigh Somalis face raids; remote work rare outside informal trade.
Management of South Sudanese: Integrated Settlement Model
South Sudanese (~200,000-250,000 in Kakuma/Kalobeyei) benefit from the 2016 Kalobeyei pilot under UNHCR's CRRF, blending refugees with ~20,000 Turkana hosts for self-reliance via farming, markets, and shared services. Less securitized than Dadaab, it allows limited movement/work permits, reflecting lower terror risks and proximity to South Sudan for returns (e.g., 2020 peace deal spurred voluntary repatriations). Still, encampment holds; 2025 stats show net gains but integration focus eases tensions.
Management of Burundians: Lower-Profile Oversight
Burundians (~16,000-20,000, 2-3% of total) primarily enter Dadaab/Kakuma via porous borders but draw minimal specialized attention due to small scale and no major security stigma. They blend into general camp operations without dedicated repatriation pushes (unlike Somalis) or settlements (unlike South Sudanese), often self-settling in Nairobi's informal economy (hawking/domestic work). Proximity via Lake Tanganyika eases entry; UNHCR aids voluntary returns (low uptake, ~900 in 2025), but no heavy policing. Political violence/economic drivers persist without Kenya's military entanglement in Burundi.
Comparison Table
| Group | Population (2025) | Primary Camps | Security Level | Repatriation Focus | Unique Features |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Somalis | ~432,000 | Dadaab | High (police, raids) | Aggressive (tripartite deals) | Terror links, urban crackdowns |
| South Sudanese | ~200k-250k | Kakuma/Kalobeyei | Medium (integrated) | Moderate (peace-driven) | Self-reliance pilot, host mixing |
| Burundians | ~16k-20k | Dadaab/Kakuma (mixed) | Low | Minimal (voluntary only) | Informal urban integration, proximity ease |
Key Differentiators
-
Scale/Security: Massive Somali numbers (44% of immigrants) trigger securitization; Burundians' tiny footprint avoids it.
-
Geopolitics: Kenya's Somalia intervention (AMISOM) heightens Somali suspicion; neutral Burundi/South Sudan ties allow flexibility.
-
Outcomes: Somalis face protracted stays (27-year average); South Sudanese gain livelihoods; Burundians evade tracking via urban flight.
Nairobi's refugee services strain universally, but Dadaab's overload amplifies Somali challenges. Kenya's 2025 Refugee Act modernizes registration but retains encampment, balancing aid (~$500M/year) with repatriation goals.
