Do Burundian Refugees Integrate Better in Kenya Than Somali Refugees?

Kenya hosts over 860,000 refugees as of late 2025, with Burundians (~16,000-20,000) showing smoother integration than Somalis (~432,000), primarily due to differences in scale, security perceptions, linguistic ties, and policy application. While both groups face the encampment policy, Burundians leverage smaller numbers and cultural affinities for urban absorption, contrasting Somalis' securitized isolation in Dadaab.

Smaller Scale Enables Flexibility

Burundians represent just 2-3% of Kenya's refugee population, allowing individualized handling without overwhelming camps. They disperse into mixed Dadaab/Kakuma settings or self-settle in Nairobi's Eastleigh, avoiding the gridlock that defines Somali management. Somalis, dominating Dadaab (50%+ of total refugees), trigger capacity strains, heavy policing, and repatriation drives, hindering economic engagement. Low Burundian visibility means less scrutiny, fostering informal work like trade and domestic services.

Lower Security Stigma

Somalis endure high-security measures—raids, curfews, and terror-linked profiling—stemming from Al-Shabaab threats and Kenya's Somalia interventions. Dadaab's militarized zones restrict movement, fueling protracted stays averaging 27 years. Burundians face no such association; Burundi's instability (political violence, poverty) lacks transnational terror ties, permitting lighter oversight and urban flight. This enables Kirundi/Swahili speakers to blend into Nairobi's informal economy without checkpoints.

Linguistic and Cultural Proximity

Burundians share Swahili and ethnic overlaps (e.g., Hutu similarities with Kenyan groups), easing social integration versus Somalis' distinct Cushitic language and Islamic culture. Nairobi's multicultural Eastleigh welcomes Burundian hawkers and laborers, with less xenophobia than Somali clans face amid clan-based tensions. Surveys indicate Kenyans view proximate refugees more favorably, aiding Burundian remittances and community ties.

Policy Application Differences

Kenya's Refugees Act 2021 and Shirika Plan promise integration via work permits and municipalities, but Somalis encounter bureaucratic hurdles and local opposition in Garissa. Dadaab MPs decry resource competition, stalling benefits. Burundians, not concentrated, access urban opportunities quietly; Kalobeyei-like models suit smaller groups better than Dadaab's overload. Voluntary returns remain low for both, but Burundians evade encampment via proximity (Lake Tanganyika routes).

Economic Participation

Burundians thrive in Nairobi's hawking, construction, and services, sending remittances amid Burundi's 40% inflation. UNHCR's PRIMES aids identity without heavy tracking. Somalis, confined to camps, rely on aid; urban Eastleigh Somalis face evictions despite businesses. Shirika Plan funding ($943M) targets integration, but Garissa backlash delays Somali gains versus Turkana's South Sudanese progress.

Social and Local Dynamics

Host biases favor Burundians' "less threatening" profile; nationwide surveys show majority Kenyan support for integration, tempered by Dadaab-specific fears. Burundians build ties via churches/markets, reducing isolation unlike Somali clan insularity. For Nairobi professionals, Burundians fill ICT-adjacent informal roles (e.g., delivery), signaling digital inclusion potential.

Challenges Ahead

Both groups risk Shirika shortfalls—aid cuts threaten services, and restricted counties limit mobility. Burundians could face future scrutiny if inflows grow; Somalis need de-securitization for parity. Kenya's neutral Burundi stance aids, but Somalia entanglements persist.

Burundians integrate better through invisibility, affinity, and flexibility—lessons for scaling Somali inclusion amid Shirika's promise.​